WE TALK TO PEOPLE, NOT CONTEXTS

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THE PLAN

Two kinds theory of the nature of speech acts:


- Addressee-directed theories.
- Context-directed theories.


Two arguments that the former are better than the latter:


- A pragmatic argument.
- A semantic argument.

ADDRESSEE-DIRECTED THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS*

*Caveat: I'm mainly interested in *communicative illocutionary* speech acts, not locutionary acts, perlocutionary acts, or institutionalized acts like getting married or christening ships.







MEANING AND INTENDING

(Grice 1957, 1968, 1969; Strawson 1964)

By doing something, x, S, **MEANT** something iff, for some audience, A, and response **R**, S did x intending

- (i) A to to have a certain response **R**
- (ii) A to recognise that S did x intending (1)
- (iii) A's recognition that S did x intending (1) to function, at least in part as a reason for (1)


MEANING AND SPEECH ACTS

(Strawson 1965; Schiffer 1972; Bach & Harnish 1978)

- To perform a speech act is to mean something.
- Different types of speech acts are individuated by different values of \mathbf{R} .

CONTEXT-DIRECTED THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS





STALNAKER (1978, 2014):

To **assert q** is to propose adding *p* to the Common Ground (CG).

ROBERTS (1996/2012):

To **ask q** is to proffer **q**, intending that it be adopted as the new Question Under Discussion (QUD).

PORTNER (2004):

To **direct A to** ϕ is to propose that ϕ be added to their section of the conversation's To-Do List (TDL).

CONTEXTS ARE PUBLIC

A proposition *p* is common ground of a conversation iff the participants *commonly accept p*:

- each accepts p;
- each accepts that each accepts p;
- etc.

(Stalnaker 2014)


A PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT


Roughly: We regularly perform speech acts and successfully communicate, in situations where we can't, and can't expect to, change the common ground.








The Coordinated Attack Problem (The Byzantine Generals Problem)




































Dear General B, The attack will be at dawn tomorrow.

Please confirm.

with love, General A.






Dear General A,


I got your message. The attack will be at dawn.

Please confirm.

your best bro, General B.



Dear General B, Got it. I love the smell of battle in the morning. Please confirm. bros 4 life, General A.




Dear General A, Roger. Lock and load. Please confirm. bro grabs, General B.

THEOREM

Given reasonable assumptions about the generals' utility functions and epistemic standards, they will never achieve common knowledge or common belief. (Akkoyunlu et al., 1975; Gray, 1978; Halpern and Moses, 1990; Yemini and Cohen, 1979)

A (PRETTY CLEAR) COROLLARY

They won't achieve common acceptance, either.




Dear General B,

I've been reading some theoretical computer science papers, and it turns out that this is never going to work.

Anyway, my men have come down with cholera. Do you know the cure?

kisses, General A






Dear General A, Shame about the attack. Wash your hands and don't eat so close to the latrines.

, General B.





(Rubenstein 1989; Binmore 1998)



CONCLUSIONS

Successful communication doesn't require changing the context, if the context is built out of common (or even shared) attitudes.


Performing a speech act doesn't require *intending* or *proposing* to update the context, either.


CONCLUSIONS


Context change can result from communication only in certain special circumstances.


Which circumstances, you might ask?


When the speaker and addressee are in a **shared situation** (Schiffer 1972; Clark & Marshall 1981).














A SEMANTIC ARGUMENT

Informal and heavily abbreviated. For the full formal semantics, see this paper (on my website): 'An Intention-Based Semantics for Imperatives'

[[Snow is white.]] = ??? DECLARATIVE

[Do the right thing!] = ???

OPTION 1: STATIC SEMANTICS, DYNAMIC PRAGMATICS (Stalnaker: Portner: von Eintel & latradou: Poherts)

(Stalnaker; Portner; von Fintel & latradou; Roberts)

- [[Snow is white.]] =
- λw_{st} . snow is white in w

(The proposition that snow is white.)

[[Do the right thing!]] =

 λw_{st} . λx_e : x = α_c . x does the right thing in w

(A property (restricted to the addressee) of doing the right thing.)

PROBLEM: MIXED COORDINATION

(We're about to go into the bar together. I say:) Buy us drinks and I'll find a table.

NOTE:

- •Needn't have a conditional meaning.
- •Can mean roughly: 'I'll find a table. Buy me a drink.'
- Can be the consequent of a conditional: 'If your friend is tending bar, buy us drinks and I'll find a table.'

PROBLEM: MIXED COORDINATION

(We're at a book store. Each of us has three books, but we only have enough money for five, total:)

Put back Naked Lunch or I'll put back Waverley. (Starr ms)

NOTE:

- Needn't have a conditional meaning.
- Can be the consequent of a conditional: 'If we only have \$5, put back Naked Lunch or I'll put back Waverly.'

PROBLEM: IMPERATIVE INFERENCE

Buy me a drink.

- You won't buy me a drink unless you go to the bar.
- \hookrightarrow So, go to the bar!
- Attack if the weather is good.
- The weather is good.
- →So, attack!

OPTION 2: DYNAMIC SEMANTICS (e.g., Starr)

[[Snow is white.]] = $\lambda C \cdot CG_C \cup \{\lambda_{w_{st}} \cdot \text{snow is white in w}\}$

(A function that adds a proposition to the Common Ground.)

$\label{eq:linearized_linearized$

(A function that adds an action to the addressee's To-Do List.)

WHY NOT DYNAMIC SEMANTICS?

- •Dynamic treatments propose contextdirected theories of speech acts.
- •They explain imperative inference in terms of *stipulated* properties of contexts features that aren't, in turn, explained.

POSITIVE VIEW

- Adopt an addressee-directed theory of speech acts.
- •(Roughly: what Grice (1968) thought.)
- An atomic clause's semantic values are the kinds of responses we communicatively intend to produce in addressees when using them literally.

BASIC SEMANTIC VALUES

(This is simplified. See 'An Intention-Based Semantics for Imperatives')

[[Snow is white.]] =

λM . M believes that snow is white.

(The property of being a mind that believes that snow is white.)

[[Do the right thing!]] =

 λ M . M intends to do the right thing.

(The property of being a mind that intends to do the right thing.)

(Cf. Charlow 2014)

COMPLEX SEMANTIC VALUES

[Buy us drinks and I'll find a table]] =

 λM . M intends to buy drinks and M intends to find a table

(The property of being a mind that intends to buy drinks and find a table.)

COMPLEX SEMANTIC VALUES

[Put back Naked Lunch or I'll put back Waverly]] =

 λM . M is in a state incompatible with failing to intend to put back Naked Lunch and failing to believe that S will put back Waverly.

IMPERATIVE INFERENCE

Buy me a drink.

You won't buy me a drink unless you go to the bar. →So, go to the bar!

This seems valid because rational agents obey strict means coherence:

A intends to ϕ

A believes that ψing is necessary for ϕing

 \rightarrow A rationally should intend to ψ .

CONCLUSIONS

- Addressee-directed theories of speech acts make better sense of a wide range of communication.
- •They're also compatible with a semantics that makes sense of embedding and inference.
- And, this account of inference explains why inferences seem valid in an independently motivated way.

